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Defendant, by and through counsel, submits the following Reply Brief in further 
support of its appeal from the judgment of the Honorable Michael K. Burton, Third 
Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered on May 18,1995. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL DOES 
NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT CAUSED ANY 
DAMAGE TO THE RENTED JET SKIS 
In a baffling interpretation of its obligation to produce some substantial evidence 
toward meeting its burden of proof, plaintiff takes the position that it was not necessary 
for it to produce a single witness with personal knowledge of the condition of the jet 
skis at the time they were returned to Just 4 Fun, to make its case in the first instance 
or to refute the testimony offered by defendant's witnesses that no noticeable damage 
existed when they finished using the jet skis. The only witness, apart from defendant, 
with personal knowledge of the condition of the jet skis on their return, Jeremy 
Meadows, was never called by plaintiff. Plaintiff implies in its brief that, contrary to 
the normal requirement of some substantial evidence being introduced by the proponent 
of a proposition as to that proposition, the burden was on defendant to call Jeremy 
1 
Meadows.1 Plaintiff's position is patently absurd. Plaintiff initiated the htigation. It 
was, therefore, plaintiff's burden to prove through the only witness they could have 
offered, the condition of the jet skis at the time they were returned. 
To establish the complete absence of liability, defendant personally testified and 
presented the testimony of Cliff Miller and Connie Morgan that the jet skis were not 
in noticeably different condition when returned than when they were rented. Plaintiff 
, having failed to call the person to whom defendant returned the skis, had the burden 
of rebutting defendant's evidence. In the absence of any rebuttal evidence, a finding 
that defendant caused damage, rather than Jeremy Meadows, is pure speculation. The 
inference that the damage occurred after the jet-skis were in the possession of Jeremy 
Meadows, the son of the owner of the company, who was rushing to go out on a date, 
could not be rebutted without his testimony. Heather Meadows, the daughter of the 
owner of Just 4 Fun, did testify, but contrary to plaintiff's veiled suggestion2, offered 
no evidence as to the condition upon check-in. Further, plaintiff's suggestion that the 
trial court made any credibility assessment against defendant is disingenuous.3 Not 
only do the findings of fact fail to find any portion of defendant's testimony not 
1
 Appellee's Brief, at page 22. 
2
 Appellee's Brief, at pp. 22-23. 
3
 Appellee's Brief, at page 23. 
2 
credible, the trial judge's own, handwritten notes of his impressions of defendant form 
a finding of the credibility of defendant; in fact, the trial judge rated the defendant "++ 
for honesty .. .". R. 266B. 
Plaintiff did not offer any evidence on the condition of the skis when they were 
returned by defendant and accepted by Just 4 Fun. The burden of proof was upon 
plaintiff, not only to show that defendant damaged the property, but also that the 
property was damaged beyond reasonable wear and tear while it was in defendant's 
possession. Plaintiff failed even in its burden to show that damage occurred in 
defendant's possession, by failing to call any witness who inspected the jet skis upon 
their return, or who could testify that any damage was not caused while the jet skis 
were in the exclusive possession of Jeremy Meadows. 
The testimony of defendant's witnesses, as to condition upon check-in, absence 
of comment by Jeremy Meadows upon check-in, and the finding of the trial judge as 
to defendant's credibility mandate judgment in favor of defendant, where no substantial 
evidence was offered through the testimony of Jeremy Meadows to the contrary. On 
the record, the trial court's finding that defendant damaged the skis or was responsible 
for damage cannot be supported because of the unrefuted evidence to the contrary. 
3 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF ALSO FAILED TO INTRODUCE ANY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT ANY 
DIFFERENCE IN CONDITION WAS OTHER THAN 
"REASONABLE WEAR AND TEAR" 
In its brief, plaintiff takes a position which is internally inconsistent. At page 27 
of Appellee's Brief, plaintiff asserts the astounding position that this litigation is not a 
contractual dispute, apparently recognizing its failure to adduce evidence to meet its 
burden to show that the jet skis were returned in a non-conforming condition under the 
contract. The disingenuous nature of this contention is exposed by reading an earher 
portion of Appellee's Brief, plaintiff's Statement of the Nature of the Case, where 
plaintiff concedes: 
The rental was covered by a written and signed contract in 
which Defendant agreed to return the jet skis in good 
condition and undamaged, subject only to reasonable wear 
and tear. 
Appellee's Brief at page 5 (emphasis supplied). To prove a breach of the rental 
contract, therefore, plaintiff had the burden to prove that the jet skis had been returned 
subject to something other than "reasonable wear and tear." 
Plaintiff appears shocked that "[defendant would have the court resolve the 
4 
meaning of the phrase 'reasonable wear and tear.'"4 What is shocking is that plaintiff 
would argue "[i]t was not necessary that the trial court resolve what 'reasonable wear 
and tear' meant as it was not a material issue."5 Perhaps plaintiff's appreciation now 
that it failed to offer any evidence on this element of its case provides a context in 
which to appreciate fully the desperation required to make that argument. 
Plaintiff simply ignored this essential contract term in its evidentiary 
presentation. It appears that plaintiff believes it may narrow the issues by merely 
characterizing its status as the "owner of a claim to collect moneys due its assignor."6 
The trial court's apparent willingness to allow plaintiff to do so, however, without 
proving a breach of the rental agreement is erroneous. 
Plaintiff takes the position that, because no case law interprets and precisely 
defines the term "ordinary wear and tear" as used in the jet ski rental industry, the term 
is incapable of definition and the trial court cannot be expected to make a finding upon 
it7. This argument, once again, illustrates plaintiff's fundamental misunderstanding of 
the case. 
4
 Appellee's Brief, at page 26. 
5
 Appellee's Brief, at page 27. 
6
 Appellee' s Brief, at page 5. 
7
 Appellee's Brief, at page 26. 
5 
Throughout these proceedings, plaintiff has characterized this case as a simple 
collection proceeding. This is not surprising. Plaintiff is a collection agency and is a 
party to the action only by reason of its position as the assignee of Just 4 Fun Rental. 
It is reasonable to presume that plaintiff's business ordinarily involves situations where 
such things as notes or accounts exist, and liability need be proven only as to unpaid 
amounts on the note or account, so that liability is not strenuously contested as an issue 
of fact, as it was in these proceedings. 
Unlike a simple collection case, defendant disputes that any sums are owing. 
It is defendant's position that the skis were rented, the rental was paid, and the skis 
were returned. Defendant contends that the skis were not damaged when he returned 
them and that the only change in the skis' condition was attributable to "reasonable 
wear and tear". Because the term "reasonable wear and tear" is not defined in case 
law, as apphed to the jet ski rental industry, and because of the need to assist the court 
in resolving the issue factually, defendant presented the testimony of an expert witness, 
Ron Sprouse. Mr. Sprouse testified, based upon his experience in the industry and 
upon his examination of photographs depicting the jet skis at the time Just 4 Fun 
presented them to a repair shop for a repair estimate, that the condition of the skis did 
not exceed the standard of "reasonable wear and tear" within the jet ski rental industry. 
R. 478-480. That testimony is unrefuted. 
6 
The trial court apparently accepted the testimony of James Meadows, president 
of Jus 4 Fun Rental, that the rented jet skis were to be returned in "like new" condition. 
The contract sued upon, and entered into evidence by the plaintiff (P. 1), defines the 
liability of the lessee for return of the equipment as follows: 
Lessee acknowledges receipt of the equipment in good 
condition, appearance and repair, and agrees to return it in 
as good of condition subject only to REASONABLE wear 
and tear. 
Nowhere in the contract is a duty of "like new" condition imposed on defendant. Thus, 
the trial court's failure to address the exclusive evidence offered on "reasonable wear 
and tear" mandates reversal. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED 
TO RELIEF FROM THE DISMISSAL UNDER 
Utah RXiv.P. 60(b) 
Defendant's opening brief contained a discussion of the reasons for relief under 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b). That discussion need not be repeated here. It is important to 
clarify this procedural argument, however, in light of plaintiff's responsive brief. 
In its brief, plaintiff abandons its claim for relief under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5)8, 
8
 "Plaintiff's motion was based upon Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) and in the alternative, 
upon 60(b)(7). In its motion, a clerical error exists in which Plaintiff refers to 
7 
resting on two alternative grounds for its alleged entitlement to rehef from the judgment 
of dismissal; specifically, UtahR.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect) and 60(b)(7) (any other reason justifying rehef from the operation 
of the judgment). 
Plaintiff in this matter is placed in a somewhat uncomfortable position. It is 
undisputed that the Satisfaction of Judgment which resulted in dismissal of the case was 
signed by the attorney then representing the plaintiff. It is clear that the attorney merely 
executed the document, perhaps one of many such documents, without having prepared 
it, or supervised its preparation9. Plaintiff must now argue that the case was dismissed 
"without a hearing on the merits", upon a "faulty Satisfaction of Judgment which 
clearly was insufficient to dismiss the claim."10 Plaintiff then asserts that, within three 
months of receiving notice that the case had been dismissed, it moved for relief from 
the dismissal. 
Plaintiff acknowledges a mistake was made and that the mistake, filing a 
60(b)(5)." Brief of Appellee, page 13. 
9
 In support of the motion for rehef from the dismissal, plaintiff filed an affidavit 
from the manager of the plaintiff. R. 106. The affidavit stated a new employee 
of the plaintiff, not the attorney and not an employee of the attorney, prepared 
the satisfaction of judgment in error. 
10
 Appellee's Brief, at page 15. 
8 
satisfaction of judgment, was plaintiff's responsibility11. It is thus acknowledged by 
plaintiff that it, in effect, caused the dismissal by filing a satisfaction — a satisfaction 
which was prepared, signed, and filed by plaintiff and its legal counsel, a copy of which 
was presumably maintained in the files of plaintiff and its counsel. Plaintiff certainly 
had notice of its own actions resulting in the dismissal. 
Plaintiff caused this case to be dismissed on December 2, 1993, by filing a 
satisfaction of judgment form. Plaintiff moved for relief under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b). 
The motion was not filed within three months of the dismissal. The motion for rehef 
from the judgment was untimely under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b). 
It is clear, then, that there was no legal basis upon which to grant the plaintiffs 
motion for relief from the dismissal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court disregarded the essential nature of the case — that is, the court 
failed to recognize that liability was disputed, not just the amount of damages. The trial 
court ignored the fact that the plaintiff (1) failed to produce Jeremy Meadows, the only 
witness who could testify based upon personal knowledge concerning the condition of 
11
 In fact, plaintiff only concedes that the mistake was "initially" its responsibility, 
asserting that the court was somehow at fault when it dismissed the case upon 
receipt of plaintiff s satisfaction of judgment. Appellee's Brief, page 13. 
9 
the jet skis at the time they were returned to Just 4 Fun by defendant and (2) failed to 
refute Defendant's expert witness or present any credible evidence of its own on the 
issue of "reasonable wear and tear" under the express provisions of the contract. 
Because the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof, the judgment must be reversed, 
with orders to enter judgment in favor of defendant, and remanded to determine 
reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses available to defendant under the rental 
contract. 
The trial court also erred in granting plaintiffs motion to vacate the dismissal in 
this matter. Because the plaintiff has abandoned its claim for relief under Utah 
R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5), and because the facts and circumstances of this case unequivocally 
fall within the ambit of Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), relief is unavailable under 60(b)(7), 
with its liberal "reasonable time" standard. Plaintiff was required to move for relief 
within three months. To find otherwise would render the differentiation between the 
subsections of Rule 60(b) meaningless. Because the motion for relief from the 
dismissal was untimely, there was no factual or legal basis for granting the motion for 
relief from the judgment of dismissal. 
For these reasons, the defendant requests that this court vacate the judgment of 
the trial court and reinstate the order of dismissal or, in the alternative, remand the case 
to the trial court for further proceedings. 
10 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of April, 1996. 
PARSONS, DXVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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